Nelson A. Miles & the America of His Time

Photograph of Nelson A. Miles, above, courtesy of: Books For Libraries Press.

The way history is first written has a lot to do with the current problems at the time of the event. The reason Nelson A. Miles was left out of history quite often was because of his enemies being in high places, a fact that is fully illustrated by the struggle between Commanding General Miles and the McKinley administration over the invasion portion of the Spanish American war. President McKinley was only going to war to appease the American public. His Secretary of War, Mr. Russell Alger had full control over the war, and sought out action against Spain for the public’s viewing in this war for his own career. Nelson Miles, on the other hand, wanted this skirmish to end as quickly as possible with the smallest loss of time, and with the smallest amount of recoil after it ended. Because of Miles' reputation for being difficult, his recommendations to attack Puerto Rico first, to attack when yellow fever outbreaks were low, and to attack when the army was adequately equipped were not taken seriously. Because the administration ignored his plans, disease outbreaks occurred, and the army had trouble executing the war strategy.

The Public Demands Action

Photograph of the wreckage of the USS Maine. Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Hispanic Division.

The McKinley administration was never inclined to war in the first place, but public sentiment forced the administration to do something or look unable to lead the country. Miles has noted that he heard on various occasions that a lone member of the administration was pushing for war, and needed an excuse to do so. That arrived when the USS Maine exploded, and the Spanish were blamed for it, though no actual evidence has ever come proving this hypothesis. General Miles reflects, “It does not matter now how this was done; whether or not any Spanish official was concerned in the destruction of this magnificent ship, nor how it occurred…. The whole nation with one voice demanded its termination.” Secretary of War Alger also recalls that “ It was spontaneous and practically universal” (SaW6) Because the administration had no inclination for war, it was caught unprepared when the public wanted to retaliate against Spain. There was no organization in the War Department to go to war, and when the Maine exploded, the lack of cooperation between the War Department and the Major General of the Army was obvious.

Divide and Conquer: Porto Rico is the Weaker Side

Nelson Miles wanted to follow the tried and true principles of warfare. The most prominent of which was the idea of “cutting the enemy’s force in two and overpowering the weaker wing first.” (StR, 274) According to Miles, when this was applied in the West Indies it would mean to attack Porto Rico and the eastern half of Cuba because these areas were less heavily guarded than the Havana side of Cuba which was entirely protected. In his book, “Serving the Republic”, Miles reflects on this:

Porto Rico and the eastern half of the island of Cuba were the objective points, in my judgment, for the active operations of our army. While I was advocating this I received a cablegram from Europe, signed by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, saying that the Spanish officials were anxious that we should attack Havana, knowing it to be heavily fortified and defensible. ... I laid this before President McKinley and his Cabinet. (StR, 274)

Nelson Miles was also advised by Mr. Carnegie that to attack Porto Rico first would have a larger impact back in Spain, and perhaps scare the Spaniards out of Cuba without having actual hostilities take place on that island. (StR, 274) The McKinley administration did not see the points Miles made, or chose to ignore them, and Secretary of War Alger ordered Miles and Major General Shafter to attack Cuba first. In Alger’s book, “The Spanish American War” after the section of telegrams Miles wrote to Alger, Alger decided that attacking Puerto Rico first “was so evidently impossible and impracticable as to need little argument as to so prove it”(SaW55) without ever describing the reasoning behind the administration’s strategy for attacking Cuba first.

Climate and Disease Factor into the Strategy

Picture of Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger. Courtesy of: Books For Libraries Press

Major-General Miles also considered the climate of Porto Rico and Cuba. He knew from past experiences by other empires that the island’s climate would be an issue if not planned for accordingly. Yellow fever, he knew, was a terrible disease in the West Indies. Yellow fever attacks the liver, kidneys, heart, and other organs. This disease is mosquito born and is typically found in the Caribbean Islands, Africa, and South America, and the incidents tend to increase during the summer. (WedMD) When the British attacked Havana in 1762, Miles says “The losses of the British in this campaign were far greater from disease than battle…. It is said, however, that at one time almost half of the British force was on the sick report.” (NAR, 521) He further says, “The plan of the campaign was carefully considered. The wet season, which would be especially dangerous to the lives of those not acclimated, and would render the movements of the troops more difficult, was near at hand. It was utterly impossible to organize an army and equip it properly before that season commenced.” Miles also wrote the Secretary of War Alger about the dangers of the rainy season, but to little avail. Alger later claims in his book that “As the rainy, or “sickly”, season was due within a month, and was likely to last until the middle of September, it was determined that the wisest course would be to devote the summer to organizing, equipping, and drilling the volunteers, and to make such harassing incursions into Cuba as might seem to be practicable.” (SaW42) Nevertheless, Cuba was attacked in August despite all this evidence.

The State of the Army at the Time of War

In the years after the Civil War, Congress had cut down the army’s size drastically, from fifty-four thousand to twenty-five thousand people. When the government called on the people to volunteer their services to the army, ample amounts of people were found. President McKinley made a request for 125,000 volunteers in April, and an additional 75,000 in May. (NAR, 517) However, the problem with this was that more than a third of the men in the army had been undrilled, and 300 men per regiment had never fired a gun. (To the Secretary of War, from Nelson Miles.) Miles also knew to be careful about using a Navy that hadn’t been in use and had gone slack over the past few decades when he wrote:

Until the supremacy of the naval forces on the Atlantic was determines, and while our great force of volunteers was being organized and equipped, it was deemed advisable to reinforce the Cuban revolutionists in every way possible…. (StR, 274)

In addition to this weakness in the army, the only guns left for the volunteers, Alger says, were .45-caliber Springfield rifles. (SaW13) Miles later on in the war asks the government to supply more ammunition for the .45-caliber Springfield guns, to which Alger responds in a telegram dated August 3, 1898: “As you ought to know, the last caliber .45 Springfield rifle was manufactured in ninety-three. Smokeless-powder cartridges are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I suggest that you get along with what the government has on hand….”(SaW58) Miles personally recommended only 50,000 well-trained and equipped volunteers. Miles “believed it better to equip such a force, than to partially train and equip a much larger body.” (MA 184) Miles also pointed out that the weakness in training a larger body “only allowed Spain the time to concentrate troops and to collect supplies and ammunition.” (MA 184) Miles brought the issue of training to Washington, writing in a telegram:

Sir: I regard it of the highest importance that the troops called into service by the President’s proclamation be thoroughly equipped, organized, and disciplined for field service. In order that this may be done with the least delay, they ought to be in camp approximately sixty days in their States, as so many of the States have made no provision for their State militia, and not one is fully equipped for field service. (Pohanka 254)

The regular army troops were not well prepared either. It was “a force largely designed for, and accustomed to, fighting Indians in the West.”(Span-Am Logist., 2)

The Spanish-American War was the United States’ first attempt at a foreign war, which Miles describes by saying, “The history of warfare shows that operations beyond the sea are at best most difficult to organize and to carry on successfully.” (NAR, 521) In order to keep the death rates minimal with a lackluster army, Nelson believed that an attack on Porto Rico in the fall would be the most advantageous, as in, perhaps Spain would give in after the capture of Puerto Rico. The McKinley administration decided that the Havana side of Cuba was the better side to attack.

Picture of Shafter (left) and Miles (right) at San Juan Hill, Cuba. Courtesy of: http://www.spanamwar.com/Miles.htm

Gen. Shafter, the man in charge of the invasion of Cuba and Porto Rico, was showing signs of sickness before his ships even set sail to Cuba. At 300 pounds and 60 years of age, he was no match for Miles who was a year younger and of average weight.(MA185) The problem with the appointment of Miles is that he did not have an education at West Point, and was a year younger than Shafter, thus giving the McKinley administration an excuse not to appoint Miles as head of the expedition. Miles remembers Shafter’s condition when he wrote, “Finding that General Shafter was seriously affected by the intense heat, and knowing the importance of the enterprise, I telegraphed for authority to go with the expedition, but the request was unanswered, and the corps under General Shafter was embarked and sailed June 14^th.”(StR, 276) The following day, Secretary of War Alger called Miles back to the mainland. The telegram read: “Important business requires your presence here. Return at once. Answer.” (StR, 276)

Even before the Spanish American War was on the table, McKinley, Alger, and Miles were not the best of friends. Way back when Geronimo was still on the loose, a man named General Crook was sent out after Geronimo to capture him. Unsuccessful after an extended period of time, Crook was replaced by Miles to capture Geronimo, which Miles did quickly. In The Most Famous Soldier in America, Amchan says that, "One can only surmise whether McKinley’s close association with Crook during the [Civil] war and Miles’ bitter feud with Crook in later years had put Miles in McKinley’s bad graces from the beginning." (MiA111)

Also, the Spanish-American War was not the first conflict between Miles and a president. When Grover Cleveland was in office, there was an issue about the “unconditional” surrender of the Apache Indians and whether or not Miles and Crook were given instructions to only accept this type of surrender. The Apaches were terrorizing Arizona and New Mexico, and were removed from the mountains for the safety of the American settlers. This type of surrender was later confirmed; however, not without having people close to Miles notice that Cleveland had painted Miles as insubordinate. After accepting the surrender of the Apaches, Miles wanted to keep the Indians in a climate where they could survive, and not die off like they did in Pennsylvania and Alabama. (MiA 84) General Crook had suggested that the Apaches be allowed to live in the Indian Territory at Ft. Sill and President Harrison agreed. (MiA 85) Miles opposed this resolution because Ft. Sill was malarias, and the Indians might escape again to the mountains where they were captured and continue to fight. He proposed sending the Indians to a reservation in North Carolina, but this type of disagreement only confirmed Cleveland’s idea that Miles was a defiant military figure who should not be paid attention to, and established this idea with the presidents to come after Harrison.

Finally, prior to the Spanish-American War, Miles was trying to change the role of Commanding General from a symbolic position left for generals on their way out, to a prestigious function of recommending how the army should operate. In Military Affairs,

“ Miles simply was not the type to voluntarily subordinate himself. He rejected the view that the role of the Commanding General was ceremonial rather than functional, and as a result his first three years in command, 1895-98 were a period of frustration as he sought in vain to exert an influence. (MA 182)

Because of Miles’ lack of respect for those higher in the chain of command than him, the McKinley administration desperately wanted to put him in his place. This could have contributed to the physically incapable Shafter being put in charge of the military operations in the West Indies, where Miles was only in charge of the military operation in Puerto Rico. This also contributed to the administration’s complete disregard for Miles’ opinion about where and when to invade, even though Miles was the Major General of the United States Army. The invasion of Cuba began in the summer of 1898, despite the risk of unprepared troops contracting yellow fever while being led by a physically unqualified leader.

The Army is Restructured

Photograph of the War Room used by the McKinley Administration during the Spanish-American War. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

The consequences of the Spanish American war on the War Department were enormous. One historian notes, “The beginning of that conflict found the US not only lacking a definite plan of campaign, but even missing accurate maps of enemy territory and reliable information about the military resources necessary to devise such a strategy.” (HT 1) It wasn't just tactical and strategic information that was missing. Supplies were poorly managed, as illustrated by the following comments from Nelson Miles: "…Over 300 railroad cars loaded with war materials were sitting idly along the roads around Tampa, Florida. The invoices and bills of lading for these shipments had not been received, forcing officers to break open seals and hunt from car to car to determine their contents." (HT 1) Many of the problems were attributed to the lack of communication between the civilian War Department and the military, headed by Commanding General Miles. According to Leonard D. White, writing in the journal Military Affairs:

Because of these failures, Secretary of War Alger resigned. The President appointed a lawyer named Elihu Root as Alger’s successor. Root pushed two army reorganization bills through Congress, one in 1901 creating the War College and another in 1903 creating the General Staff and eliminating the position of Commanding General in favor of a Chief of Staff. For more information about how the failures of the Spanish-American War led to the reorganization of the War Department, refer to this article on the Birth of the US War Department General Staff, 1898-1916 from the Historical Text Archive.

Results of the War

Nelson A. Miles' lack of respect for his superiors led to their ignoring his well-qualified opinions on the attack in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Miles’ opinions were not without merit; this was a General who fought many campaigns in his lifetime prior to the Spanish American War. Nelson A. Miles was a man who wasn’t always loved, but was out there fighting in the war and knew what was best for his men. His predictions about outbreaks of yellow fever were correct, and Shafter’s inabilities to lead due to his poor health, slowed down the war considerably. Had Nelson’s opinions been listened to, the controversies after the Spanish American War because of the lack of communication between the War Department and the front lines would have been greatly diminished in number.

Politics Destroys Chance in History Books

The Public Demands Action

Divide and Conquer: Porto Rico is the Weaker Side

Climate and Disease Factor into the Strategy

The State of the Army at the Time of War

The Army is Restructured

Results of the War